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Abstract 
Disaster researchers have established the determinants of mitigation and 
preparedness at the household level of analysis. However, at the organizational 
level, there is limited research and no theory to guide research on the determinants 
of mitigation and preparedness. The research question is “what are the determinants 
of mitigation and preparedness at the organizational level?” The data come from a 
survey of 227 organizations in Memphis, Tennessee. This study uses Tobit 
regression technique to identify the determinants and finds that organizational size 
and concern over disaster impact are strong positive determinants of mitigation and 
preparedness in organizations. In addition, there is a significant and nonlinear 
relationship between organizational obstacle and mitigation and preparedness 
activities. This study concludes with policy implications and recommendations for 
future studies. 
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Introduction 
This study defines disasters as events, such as floods or earthquakes, which 
lead to major organizational disruption, loss of life, or property destruction. 
Myriads of risks and hazards, such as natural hazards, technological hazards, 
and terrorism, are capable of becoming disasters or crises in the presence of 
suitable conditions. However, a good understanding of risks and hazards can 
help societies ameliorate the effects of these events. The following few 
examples highlight the monumental losses that can result when risks and 
hazards become disasters. The Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989 caused 62 
deaths, injured 3,757 people, displaced over 20,000 people, destroyed 
18,306 homes and businesses, and caused over 6 billion dollars in economic 
losses (Mileti and O’Brien 1992). The September 11 terrorist attacks caused 
2,973 fatalities (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States 2004). The estimate of economic losses from Hurricane Katrina is 
over $200 billion (Burby 2006). The colossal nature of disaster-induced 
losses is, indeed, worrisome and data from government agencies, the 
insurance community, and the disaster literature suggest continued increases 
in disaster losses. In light of potential future increases in the number of 
disasters and, consequently, disaster losses, there is a need to study ways of 
stemming disaster losses. Engaging in mitigation and preparedness activities 
can help to lessen disaster impacts and ultimately reduce disaster losses.  
A number of disaster researchers have established the determinants 
of preparedness and mitigation at the household level (Dooley et al. 1992; 
Edwards 1993; Bourque et al. 2006). However, at the organizational level, 
there is limited research on the determinants of mitigation and preparedness. 
In other words, there is a gap in the disaster literature regarding the 
determinants of organizational mitigation and preparedness. Furthermore, 
there is no theory to guide research on the determinants of mitigation and 
preparedness at the organizational level. Knowledge of these determinants 
can help to understand the factors that are instrumental in motivating 
organizations to adopt mitigation and preparedness measures. This study 
attempts to narrow this gap by studying the determinants of organizational 
mitigation and preparedness for disasters among Memphis/Shelby County 
organizations. In this study, an organization is “a social unit with some 
particular purposes” (Shafritz et al. 2005, 1). The broadness of this definition 
is useful for this study because it covers the organizations (private, 
nongovernmental, and public organizations) that this study examined. 
Organizations are the unit of analysis in this study for many reasons. First, 
there is a dearth of disaster research at the organizational level (Tierney 
1997; Webb et al. 2000). Second, organizations are an important decision-
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making unit in the community. Third, organizations are a significant 
contributor to the United States economy.  
The research question is “what are the determinants of mitigation 
and preparedness in organizations?" Only by identifying these factors will 
policymakers be able to make appropriate policies to stem disaster losses in 
organizations. The following four sub-questions provide a good foundation 
for exploring the research question. (i) Does concern over disaster impact 
lead to more mitigation and preparedness? (ii) What is the relationship 
between mitigation and preparedness and organizational obstacles? (iii) Do 
single-location organizations engage in less mitigation and preparedness 
than multiple-location organizations? (iv) Does organizational size have a 
positive effect on mitigation and preparedness? 
This study is important to disaster researchers by identifying the 
factors that make an organization want to prepare for and mitigate disasters. 
Knowledge of such factors can contribute to the development of appropriate 
theories and provide a solid basis on which to institute disaster policies.  
 
 
Theoretical Foundation 
 
Disasters and Organizational Survival 
 
The survival of organizations is very important. This is why organizational 
theorists have devoted much time to studying how organizations manage to 
survive (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Acquisition and maintenance of 
resources are vital to organizational survival (ibid.) or as a vital stimulus for 
organizational formation and survival (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983). No organization is self-reliant; every organization must 
transact with its external environment for needed resources (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). However, the external environment is not dependable and 
may sometimes threaten the survival of organizations. Disasters may cause, 
among other types of losses, organizational disruption (Lindell and Perry 
2007) and loss of services from public organizations and non-profit 
organizations, consequently undermining the economy and support systems 
of communities (ibid.). Organizations cannot control the physical 
characteristics of disasters, such as magnitude and frequency (Nigg 1996); 
they can, however, reduce their impacts by engaging in a number of 
mitigation and preparedness measures (Dahlhamer and D’Souza 1997).  
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Disaster Research at the Organizational Level: The Need for More 
The field of disaster research has expanded since its inception in the early 
1950s (Quarantelli 2003), with increased growth in research at the 
individual, household, community, and public-sector organizational levels 
(Tierney 1997; Webb et al. 2000). In fact, many studies in the disaster 
management literature focus either on household surveys (e.g., Jackson 
1981; Davis 1989; Dooley et al. 1992; Edwards 1993; Farley 1998; Atwood 
and Major 2000) or on surveys of policy elite active in a community (e.g., 
Drabek et al. 1983; Mushkatel and Nigg 1987; Berke and Beatley 1992; May 
and Birkland 1994; Burby et al. 2000; Wood 2004). Unfortunately, disaster 
researchers have largely neglected the organizational level (Tierney 1997; 
Webb et al. 2000). The neglect of disaster research at the organizational 
level may be because organizations are difficult to sample or because some 
organizations are afraid of the potential consequences of divulging disaster 
information (Auf der Heide 1989). 
A body of pre-disaster research at the organizational level is 
beginning to emerge due to the foundational work of some eminent 
researchers like Quarantelli, Lawrence, Tierney, and Johnson. This group of 
researchers examined how chemical companies and government agencies in 
18 U.S. communities plan for chemical emergencies (Quarantelli et al. 
1979). A little over a decade later, Drabek (1991; 1994a; 1994b) investigated 
how businesses in the tourism industry carry out evacuation planning. Mileti 
et al. (1993) studied how 54 businesses in eight San Francisco counties 
adopt earthquake preparedness measures. Furthermore, Barlow (1993) 
investigated the impact of Iben Browning earthquake prediction on 20 
businesses in the St. Louis area. Dahlhamer and D’Souza (1997) investigated 
the determinants of business disaster preparedness in Memphis/Shelby 
County, Tennessee, and Des Moines/Polk County, Iowa.  Lastly, Webb et al. 
(2000) used a series of surveys to explore the preparedness and disaster 
experiences of businesses in different parts of the country, including 
Memphis, Tennessee.  
Why Mitigation and Preparedness? 
Mitigation and preparedness are important to society both practically (to 
organizations and the emergency management community) and theoretically 
(to the academic community). First, mitigation and preparedness can make it 
easier for organizations to survive disasters by providing opportunities to 
lessen their severity. For example, before an earthquake, it is possible to 
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institute building codes that will help to strengthen buildings. Once an 
earthquake occurs, it will be too late to carry out this measure.  
 Similarly, organizations with effective contingency plans and 
warning systems would stand a better chance of survival than organizations 
without these preparedness measures. Second, if organizations have 
mitigation and preparedness strategies in place, they are likely to be less 
reliant on emergency responders, thus freeing up resources for other 
purposes. It is important to emphasize here that effective mitigation and 
preparedness programs and policies for disasters do not preclude the need 
for emergency responders. Third, mitigation and preparedness can help to 
lay a solid foundation for effective disaster response (Dahlhamer and 
D’Souza 1997) and serve as a first step in understanding recovery in 
organizations. For instance, mitigation and preparedness can assist 
researchers in understanding why some organizations fail and others survive 
disasters.  
 
Determinants of Mitigation and Preparedness in Organizations 
 
Many disaster researchers have focused on the determinants of mitigation 
and preparedness at the household level. At this level, the story is clear. 
Household preparedness depends, among other determinants, on the 
presence of children (Edwards 1993), marital status, concern about a 
disaster, length of residence (Dooley et al. 1992), education, and household 
income (Edwards 1993; Bourque et al. 2006). At the organizational level, the 
determinants are ambiguous and the amount of research is limited. Some 
scholars have recognized the dearth of studies in this area and have called 
for more research on disaster mitigation and preparedness at the 
organizational level (e.g., Drabek 1986; Dynes and Drabek 1994). Drabek 
(1986) issued a call after his review of the disaster literature unearthed only 
a few disaster preparedness studies at the organizational level. The current 
study is an attempt to heed this call. The following paragraphs discuss the 
determinants of mitigation and preparedness in organizations. 
Firm size is the most consistent (Dahlhamer and D’Souza 1997) and 
important (Webb et al. 2000) predictor of organizational mitigation and 
preparedness in studies conducted by the Disaster Research Center (DRC). 
Past studies suggest that larger firms do more to mitigate and prepare for 
disasters than do smaller firms. For example, in their study of 18 chemical 
companies, Quarantelli et al. (1979) found that larger companies were more 
likely to engage in more planning than smaller companies. Similarly, in a 
study of disaster evacuation planning in the tourist industry, Drabek (1991; 
1994a; 1994b) found that firms with more employees had more extensive 
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disaster evacuation plans than firms with less employees. Some researchers 
interpreted this relationship in the context of resource availability; the 
argument is that larger firms have more resources to devote to disaster 
mitigation and preparedness than smaller firms.  
Such a resource argument is common in the disaster literature at the 
household (Mileti 1999), community (May and Birkland 1994; Wood 2004), 
and organizational levels (Mileti et al. 1993; Dahlhamer and D’Souza 1997).  
Evidence in the disaster literature indicates that some sectors engage 
in more mitigation and preparedness than others. For instance, Drabek 
(1991; 1995) found that there was a significant relationship between 
business type and disaster evacuation planning, with lodging businesses 
having more extensive disaster evacuation plans than restaurants, 
entertainment businesses, and firms in the travel industry. Similarly, 
Dahlhamer and D’Souza (1997) found that businesses in finance, insurance, 
and real estate do more to prepare for disasters than businesses in other 
sectors. One reason for this finding is the higher degree of regulation and 
oversight in this sector (Webb et al. 2000). 
There are indications in the disaster literature that a high level of 
concern over disaster impacts, such as loss of life and personal injury, may 
induce individuals to engage in preparedness activities. In her study of the 
effect of the Iben Browning earthquake prediction, Showalter (1993) found a 
positive relationship between concern over loss of life and personal injury 
and respondents’ willingness to engage in preparedness activities. Research 
on risk perception and risk visualization suggests that information on the 
potential impacts of disasters can motivate people to reduce their risks (e.g., 
Slovic et al. 1991; Sandman et al. 1994; Flynn et al. 1999). 
Ownership pattern implies whether an organization is a single firm 
or a franchise. Empirical evidence suggests that franchises do more to 
mitigate and prepare for disasters than single firms. For instance, Drabek 
(1991; 1994a; 1994b; 1995) found that firms that were part of a larger chain 
engaged in more disaster evacuation planning than single firms.  This 
finding is in line with that of Quarantelli et al. (1979), who found that 
national chemical companies engaged in more preparedness than single local 
chemical firms. This finding may be due to the mandates given to local 
chapters by corporate headquarters to engage in disaster preparedness 
(Dahlhamer and D’Souza 1997).  
Both internal and external obstacles confront organizations. This 
study focuses on internal organizational obstacles to disaster mitigation and 
preparedness, while recognizing the existence of external organizational 
obstacles, such as competition from other organizations. This study defines 
internal organizational obstacles as factors inside organizations that inhibit 
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organizations’ ability to mitigate and prepare for disasters. Because this 
study considers internal obstacles only, the word “obstacle” implies internal 
organizational obstacles.  
Disasters can sometimes be beyond human control. We can, 
however, mitigate and prepare using an important ingredient, the acquisition 
of information (Major 1998).  
 The disaster management literature has focused much on the role of 
information in household preparedness for earthquakes. Information on 
earthquake risks can induce households to take preparatory action (Jackson 
and Mukerjee 1974; Sullivan et al. 1977; Palm 1981; Turner 1983; Russell et 
al. 1995; Flynn et al. 1999; Atwood and Major 2000; Celsi et al. 2005). 
Researchers have documented the pivotal role policy entrepreneurs or 
champions play in the policymaking process (e.g., Kingdon 1984; Prater and 
Lindell 2000; Wood 2004; Olshansky 2005). These entrepreneurs are willing 
to, among other strategies, mobilize support for their issues if necessary 
(Berke and Beatley 1992). Support from different levels within an 
organization provides a variety of functions that affect the probability of 
success (Selznick 1957; Yukl 1989; Bass 1997).  Support is just as important 
in organizations as it is in the policymaking arena. For instance, the support 
of upper-level management is crucial in the adoption of mitigation and 
preparedness measures. Mitigating and preparing for disasters require time, 
money, and effort (Wyner and Mann 1986). Lack of financial and technical 
resources can constrain the adoption of earthquake mitigation policies 
(Bostrom et al. 2006).   
  
Study Location: Memphis/Shelby County and Disasters 
 
Memphis is the largest city in Tennessee with a population of about 
650,000 people. Earthquakes are a big disaster risk in the Memphis area due 
to the hazard posed by the New Madrid Fault Zone. The three most powerful 
earthquakes in the U.S. (magnitude 7.0–8.1) occurred in the New Madrid 
Seismic Zone (NMSZ) (Memphis and Shelby County were not settlements 
then) between December 16, 1811 and February 7, 1812 (United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) 2008).  USGS (1998) estimated that there is 
more than 90% probability of a moderate earthquake (magnitude 6–7) hitting 
the NMSZ within the next 50 years. Still, Memphis faces threats from other 
disasters, such as floods, tornadoes, ice storms, chemical spills, fires, severe 
storms, violent crimes, and toxic releases. For instance, on July 22, 2003, a 
windstorm (later called Hurricane Elvis) left over 300,000 utility consumers 
in the dark; it took two weeks to restore power for everyone (Shepard 2003).  
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A study of organizations in Memphis/Shelby County makes for an 
interesting case for several reasons. The rarity of major earthquakes 
(magnitude 7.0 or greater) in Memphis/Shelby County in recent time poses 
challenges for organizations in deciding to mitigate and prepare. The 
absence of such disasters makes organizations apathetic and reluctant to 
adopt such measures (May 1986; Lindell and Perry 2007).   
In addition, a vast majority of studies on earthquakes and disasters 
exist on the west coast, especially California (e.g., Jackson and Mukerjee 
1974; Kiecolt and Nigg 1982; Mulilis and Duval 1995; Argothy 2003; May 
and Wood 2003; Wood 2004; Celsi et al. 2005). Very few studies have 
analyzed responses to disaster risks in Memphis (e.g., Edwards 1993) and 
few in the NMSZ where risks have low probabilities and high consequences 
(e.g., Mushkatel and Nigg 1987; Olshansky 1994; Farley 1998; Major 1998; 
Atwood and Major 2000). Finally, studies on organizational preparedness 
suggest that organizations in Memphis/Shelby County do little to prepare for 
disasters (e.g., Dahlhamer and D’Souza 1997; Webb et al. 2000). 
Methodology 
Data Collection 
The data used in this study come from studying the influence of 
organizational structures on earthquake decision-making in Memphis/Shelby 
County, Tennessee. The research team collected disaster information from a 
random sample of public, private, and nonprofit organizations involved in 
disaster risk issues and organizations that a major disaster will significantly 
affect.  
Interview Phase. The research team conducted 15 exploratory interviews 
with 15 different organizations in Memphis/Shelby County in the spring and 
summer of 2006. The interviews consisted of open-ended interview 
questions, conducted in person or via telephone with the professional 
managers in the offices of their organizations. Interview questions addressed 
attitudes toward hazard risk management and risk information, as well as 
organizational actions with respect to risk. The interviews took 
approximately 30–60 minutes each. The research team summarized the 
interviews and sent them back to the interviewees to ensure the accuracy of 
the information provided. The interviews inform the survey questions. 
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Survey Phase. This phase consisted of a survey administered in fall 2006. 
The survey questions were in two parts. The first part consists of questions 
regarding risk issues in organizations, such as availability of risk managers, 
amount of resources devoted to disaster planning, level of disaster concern, 
use of disaster information, impacts of disasters, engagement in mitigation 
and preparedness activities, sources of disaster information, and obstacles to 
disaster planning.  
 
 The second part deals with demographic information about 
organizational representatives that answered the surveys, such as age, length 
of residence in Memphis/Shelby County, duration in current position within 
the organization, and educational level.  
With the help of the Memphis Regional Chambers of Commerce, 
the research team queried an online reference service, ReferenceUSA, using 
“number of employees” as a key index variable to allow organizations of all 
sizes in the Memphis Metropolitan Area to be surveyed and represented in 
sufficient numbers. The research team re-categorized “number of 
employees” into seven categories (1–9, 10–19, 20–49, 50–99, 100–249, 
250–499, and ≥500). The research team sampled 100 organizations from the 
first six categories and sampled the entire population of 101 organizations 
from the last category, and added 32 utility companies to make 733 
organizations.  
The research team delivered the surveys following a modification of 
the Total Design Method (Dillman 2000). Of the 733 organizations, 227 
organizations returned the survey, giving a response rate of about 31%. This 
response rate is lower than the 40% obtained by Dahlhamer and D’Souza 
(1997). Nevertheless, what is more important about this response rate is the 
extent to which it provides a balanced sample of the original population. In 
addition to the interviews and surveys, the research team analyzed publicly 
available documents and reports, such as Memphis newspapers, USGS 
reports, and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reports. 
 
Uniqueness of Data 
 
The organizational survey data are unique in two ways. First, the data 
contain rare information on organizational representatives’ perspective on 
how their organizations address disaster risks. Getting disaster information 
on organizations is difficult because some organizations are afraid of the 
potential consequences of divulging such information (Auf der Heide 1989). 
Second, the data contain information on organizational mitigation and 
preparedness for many types of disasters in an area subject to moderate 
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seismic risk. The literature on disasters shows that there is a tendency for 
researchers investigating disaster preparedness in organizations to focus on 
specific hazards (Mileti 1999). Thus, with the exception of the DRC data, 
there are no other data available, to my knowledge, on how organizations are 
preparing for different types of disasters.  In addition, some researchers have 
surveyed organizations in high seismic risk regions, like California, and only 
a small number of researchers have surveyed organizations in the NMSZ.  
Data Issues 
The research team recognizes the potential problems that could plague the 
organizational survey data, such as internal validity, data entry errors, and 
selection bias. As a result, the research team took some steps to minimize 
these problems. Internal validity refers to the possibility that the conclusions 
drawn by a study may not precisely reflect what went on in that study 
(Babbie 2007). Prior to the design of the organizational surveys, the research 
team conducted 15 interviews. These interviews provided a good 
understanding of the issues of interest and the way in which Memphis 
organizations conceptualized these issues. For instance, the research team 
gained insights on what Memphis/Shelby County organizations understood 
by the word “disasters.” In sum, the interview phase enabled the research 
team to define relevant concepts properly prior to administering the surveys. 
Nevertheless, this study faces the potential threat to internal validity 
resulting from testing (ibid.). For instance, the organizations interviewed, 
who are among those that answered the survey, may give biased responses 
on the survey because they knew what issues were of interest to the research 
team from the preliminary interviews.  
To reduce data entry errors, two graduate students, including myself, 
entered and coded the organizational survey data separately. The other coder 
and I resolved a few typographical errors. With regard to selection bias, this 
study used the Heckman approach (the analysis is not shown here). The 
result from the Heckman model indicated that there was no selection bias in 
the organizational survey data. 
Hypotheses 
In order to answer the research questions, I test the following hypotheses. 
The null hypothesis in each case is that there is no significant relationship 
between the independent variable and the dependent variable. 
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Hypothesis 1: Organizations that are concerned about disaster impact will be 
more likely than organizations that are not to engage in mitigation and 
preparedness activities.   
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between organizational obstacles and 
mitigation and preparedness activities.  
Hypothesis 3: Single location organizations will be less likely to engage in 
mitigation and preparedness activities than multiple-location organizations. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between organizational size 
and engagement in mitigation and preparedness activities. 
 
Estimation Methodology 
 
In this section, this study uses Tobit analysis to answer the research question. 
Before discussing the Tobit analysis, this study makes two assumptions. 
First, it assumes that there are some organizations in the sample that are 
against the adoption of mitigation and preparedness activities. These 
organizations are considered as having negative values for mitigation and 
preparedness activities. Second, it assumes that there are some organizations 
in the sample that engaged in more than ten mitigation and preparedness 
activities over the past year. For instance, some organizations might have 
purchased emergency supply kits in addition to engaging in the 10 activities.  
This study has restricted the sample based on the dependent variable 
by bounding it between 0 (lower limit) and 10 (upper limit). In other words, 
the dependent variable is censored from both left and right, meaning that we 
cannot observe organizations that are below 0 or above 10. Tobit is the 
appropriate technique for analyzing censored samples because Ordinary 
Lease Square will yield biased coefficients (Wooldridge 2003). The Tobit 
model in this study takes the form: 
 
Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness (Yi*) = β0 + β1 (disaster impact) 
– β2 (organizational obstacle) + β3 (organizational obstacle2) + β4 (single 
location) + β5 (organizational size) + β6 (educational sector) + β7 (health 
sector) − β8 (wholesale/retail sector)+ ε  
 
Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness (Yi) = β0 + β1 (disaster impact) – 
β2 (organizational obstacle) + β3 (organizational obstacle2) + β4 (single 
location) + β5 (organizational size) + β6 (educational sector) + β7 (health 
sector) – β8 (wholesale/retail sector)   + ε, if 0 < Yi* ≤ 10 
Yi = 0, if Yi* ≤ 0 
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where, Yi* is the latent mitigation and preparedness activities adopted and Yi
is the observed mitigation and preparedness activities adopted.  
A Model of Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness 
This section presents a model of mitigation and preparedness at the 
organizational level. This model was developed from prior research on 
business disaster preparedness (e.g., Quarantelli et al. 1979; Dahlhamer and 
D’Souza 1997; Webb et al. 2000) and earthquake preparedness at the 
household level (e.g., Showalter 1993). This model assumes that the 
relationships that exist between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables at the household level will also exist at the organizational level. 
This assumption is reasonable because households and organizations share 
many goals, including survival. This model is a simple representation of the 
factors that affect mitigation and preparedness in organizations and the 
potential direction of each factor. 
Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness (Yi) = β0 + β1 (disaster impact) – 
β2 (organizational obstacle) + β3 (organizational obstacle2) + β4 (single 
location) + β5 (organizational size) + β6 (educational sector) + β7 (health 
sector) – β8 (wholesale/retail sector)   + ε 
Variable Measurement 
Dependent Variable. This study defines the dependent variable, total number 
of mitigation and preparedness activities, as engagement in 10 mitigation 
and preparedness activities. The survey asked, “Has your organization 
engaged in any of these activities over the past year?” Each of the dependent 
variables has two options, yes and no. The mitigation and preparedness 
activities are the following: (i) Attended disaster meetings/training courses 
outside your organization. (ii) Mentioned a potential disaster in an 
organizational meeting. (iii) Held disaster-related workshops/trainings 
within your organization. (iv) Discussed in an organizational meeting short-
term responses to disasters. (v) Discussed in an organizational meeting long-
term strategies for recovery from disasters. (vi) Arranged site visits by 
consultants or experts to better prepare for disasters. (vii) Provided 
information to customers/members of the community on issues related to 
disasters. (viii)  Assessed or evaluated vulnerability to disasters or estimated 
potential losses from disasters. (ix) Engaged in nonstructural mitigation 
measures (e.g., securing computers). (x) Engaged in structural mitigation 
measures (e.g., strengthening parts of a building).  
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The operational measure of the dependent variable is an index of the 
aforementioned 10 different mitigation and preparedness activities that 
organizations can engage in. This study creates 10 dummy variables, each 
coded 1 for those organizations who said they engaged in that particular 
activity and 0 otherwise. The responses for each respondent were added to 
arrive at the total number of mitigation and preparedness activity for each 
observation. This ten-item index is reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88). 
Adding mitigation and preparedness activities together is a simple and 
convenient way of creating an index, but it does have problems.  
 First, the addition implies that each activity is equally weighted. For 
example, based on effort, it is not reasonable to expect that “Mentioning a 
potential disaster in an organizational meeting” would require the same level 
of effort as “Engaging in structural mitigation.” Second, the addition makes 
the values of the dependent variable range from 0 to 10.   
 
Independent Variables. This study explains mitigation and preparedness 
using the independent variables below and includes three variables as 
controls for organizational sector.  
 
Concern over Disaster Impacts. Evidence in the disaster literature on 
household preparedness for earthquakes shows that people concerned over 
loss of life and personal injury are likely to engage in preparedness activities 
(Showalter 1993). In other words, organizations that are concerned about 
disaster impacts, such as loss of employee life, are more likely to engage in 
mitigation and preparedness activities than organizations that are not. This 
study measures this variable by the survey question: “Please indicate the 
extent to which the following disaster impacts might adversely affect your 
organization” (1=Minor Adverse Impact, to 5=Major Adverse Impact). 
Respondents could check a box for responses deemed “Not Applicable.” The 
13 disaster impacts are (i) damaged reputation, (ii) disruption in supplies or 
deliveries, (iii) inability to communicate with employees, (iv) inadequate 
number of employees, (v) loss of commercial goods, (vi) loss of customers, 
(vii) loss of data, (viii) loss of life, (ix) loss of life support (food, water, etc.), 
(x) loss relative to competitor’s loss, (xi) power outage, (xii) structural 
damage, and (xiii) transportation disruption. The scale of the variables is 1 to 
5 (minor to major adverse impact). For simplicity, this study considers scales 
1 and 2 to be minor adverse impact, scale 3 to be moderate adverse impact, 
and scales 4 and 5 to be major adverse impact. This study creates a new 
independent variable, the mean of all the 13 impacts, by adding the values 
for all the disaster impacts (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81) and dividing by 13. 
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Organizational Obstacles. This study measures this independent variable by 
the survey question “Please indicate the extent to which of the following 
statements are obstacles to disaster planning in your organization: (a) Lack 
of financial resources to prepare for disasters, (b) Lack of support from 
upper-level management within your organization, (c) Lack of support from 
mid- and lower-level organizational members, (d) Lack of information about 
the frequency and magnitude of disasters, (e) Lack of convincing 
information about the potential impacts of disasters, (f) Unclear 
organizational benefits from disaster planning and mitigation.” The scale of 
the variables is 1 to 5 (minor to major obstacle).  
Again, for simplicity, this study considers scales 1 and 2 to be minor 
obstacle, scale 3 to be moderate obstacle, and scales 4 and 5 to be major 
obstacle. This study develops an index, the mean of all the obstacles, by 
adding the values for all the obstacles together (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85) 
and dividing by 6. A new variable, the square of the mean of all the 
obstacles, was generated in Stata. This new variable takes care of the 
nonlinear relationship between the dependent variable and this independent 
variable. 
Ownership Pattern of Organizations. Evidence in the disaster literature 
indicates that franchises do more to mitigate and prepare for disasters than 
single firms (Quarantelli et al. 1979; Drabek 1991; 1994a; 1994b; 1995). 
This variable is a dummy: 1=single-location firm, 0=“others.” The “others” 
category includes headquarters, subsidiaries, and branch. Memphis Regional 
Chambers of Commerce provided the information on whether an 
organization is a single firm or franchise. 
Organizational Size. Previous disaster studies suggest that larger firms do 
more to mitigate and prepare for disasters than do smaller firms (Quarantelli 
et al. 1979; Drabek 1991; 1994a; 1994b; Dahlhamer and D’Souza 1997). 
This study operationalizes this variable by the number of employees in an 
organization. Memphis Regional Chambers of Commerce provided the 
information on organizational size. 
Organizational Sector. Disaster researchers have found a significant 
relationship between organizational sector and engaging in preparedness 
activities (Drabek 1991; 1995; Mileti et al. 1993; Dahlhamer and D’Souza 
1997). This study uses three variables as controls for three sectors: 
education, health, and wholesale/retail trade. Each of these control variables 
is a dummy variable: 1 if a respondent organization belongs to a sector and 0 
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otherwise. Memphis Regional Chambers of Commerce provided the 
information on the organizational sector. 
 
Missing Values 
 
Some of the variables had some missing values. In order to increase the 
sample size, this study recoded missing values as zeroes (for the dependent 
variable, total number of mitigation and preparedness activities) and recoded 
missing values and “not applicable” responses as zeroes (for the independent 
variables, disaster impact and organizational obstacle).  
 It does seem reasonable to recode “not applicable” as zero for these 
independent variables because by selecting not applicable, the respondent is 
indirectly saying that a disaster impact is less than “minor disaster impact” 
or that an organizational obstacle is less than “minor obstacle.” In this case, 
zero is less than “minor disaster impact” and less than “minor obstacle,” 
each of which has a value of 1 (on a scale of 1−5). After recoding, the 
sample size went up from 146 to 215 because observations that were 
previously excluded by Stata due to missing values are now included. 
 
 
Empirical Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Respondents 
 
Table1 shows the minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation values 
for age, years of residence, years in current position within the organization, 
and years of formal education for the respondent individuals.  
 
Table 1. Minimum, Maximum, Mean, and Standard Deviation for Individual 
Respondents 
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std.   
Dev. 
N (# of 
observations) 
Age of respondent 22 84 49.77 10.54 211 
Number of years of residence 
in Memphis/Shelby County 0 76 32.97 18.15 216 
Number of years in current 
position within organization 
0 52 11.69 10.78 217 
Number of years of formal 
education 2 25 15.96 3.34 216 
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Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables. On average, Memphis/Shelby County organizations engaged in 
4.3 of the 10 mitigation and preparedness activities. This result may be an 
indication that Memphis/Shelby County organizations are actually doing 
more to mitigate and prepare for disasters than previous studies suggest (e.g., 
Dahlhamer and D’Souza 1997). Respondents reported that disaster impacts 
have a moderate adverse impact on their organizations (3.29).  
In addition, respondents view organizational obstacles as minor 
impediments to disaster planning (1.88). Single-location organizations 
represent 78% of all respondent organizations. This number is comparable to 
the proportion of single-location organizations in the sampling frame (71%). 
About 8% of respondent organizations belong to the educational sector. 
Twice this number belong to the health sector, and 15% of respondent 
organizations constitute the wholesale/retail sector.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
with Recoded Values 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observation 
Total number of mitigation and 
preparedness activities (DV) 4.34 3.40 0 10 225 
Mean disaster impact 3.29 1.27 0 5 225 
Mean number of organizational 
obstacle to mitigation and 
preparedness 1.88 1.33 0 5 225 
Mean number of organizational 
obstacle to mitigation and 
preparedness squared 5.29 5.28 0 25 225 
Single-location organization 0.78 — 0 1 218 
Number of employees 3.86 1.87 1 7 215 
Educational sector 0.08 — 0 1 225 
Health sector 0.16 — 0 1 225 
Wholesale/retail sector 0.15 — 0 1 225 
Correlation between the Dependent and Independent Variables 
Before discussing the results of the multivariate regression, this study 
discusses the results of the correlations between the dependent variable and 
the independent variables. The goal is to understand the association between 
the dependent variable and each of the independent variables. Table 3 shows 
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that there is a positive association between mitigation and preparedness and 
disaster impact, mean organizational obstacle, number of employees, 
organizations in the educational sector, and organizations in the health 
sector. 
 
Table 3. Pairwise correlations between dependent and independent variables 
  Total Number of 
Mitigation and 
Preparedness 
Activities (DV) 
Observation 
Mean disaster impact 0.218*** 225 
Mean number of 
organizational obstacle to 
mitigation and preparedness 
0.084 225 
Mean number of 
organizational obstacle to 
mitigation and preparedness 
squared 
−0.015 225 
Single-location organization −0.270*** 218 
Number of employees  0.485*** 215 
Education 0.188*** 225 
Health 0.120* 225 
Wholesale/retail −0.273*** 225 
 
*** p<0.01  
** p<0.05 
* p<0.1 
 
 Conversely, there is a negative association between mitigation and 
preparedness and mean organizational obstacle squared, single-location 
organizations as well as organizations in the wholesale/retail sector. All the 
correlation coefficients are significant except for the correlation coefficient 
on the mean number of organizational obstacle and the mean number of 
organizational obstacle squared.  
 
Results of the Tobit Analyses 
 
This section presents the results of the Tobit model. Table 4 indicates that 
this model and all the independent variables are statistically significant. This 
study focuses on the signs and significance of the coefficients in the 
following paragraphs.  
Table 4. Summary of Results  
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Total Number of Mitigation and 
Preparedness Activities (DV) 
Tobit with Recoded  
Values (n=215)  
Pseudo R2=0.107 
Mean disaster impact 
0.53 (0.20)*** 
Mean number of organizational 
obstacle to mitigation and 
preparedness 
1.03 (0.54)* 
Mean number of organizational 
obstacle to mitigation and 
preparedness squared 
−0.33 (0.14)** 
Single-location organization 
−2.71 (0.61)*** 
Number of employees 
0.84 (0.13)*** 
Educational sector 
3.02 (0.89)*** 
Health sector 
1.71 (0.67)** 
Wholesale/retail sector 
−2.20 (0.70)*** 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
*** p<0.01  
** p<0.05 
* p<0.1 
The Tobit result suggests that there is a significant positive 
association between mitigation and preparedness and concern over disaster 
impacts, organizational obstacle, and number of employees. Conversely, 
there is a significant negative association between mitigation and 
preparedness and organizational obstacle squared and single-location 
organization. 
Memphis/Shelby County organizations that were concerned about 
disaster impacts engaged in mitigation and preparedness activities over the 
past year (p<0.01). Similarly, one could argue that the more disaster 
mitigation and preparedness activities an organization engages in, the lower 
the concern about disaster impact.  In other words, there may be simultaneity 
between mitigation and preparedness and concern about disaster impact. 
However, the positive association between mitigation and preparedness 
activities and concern about disaster impact in the data casts doubt on such a 
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negative relationship. In addition, past disaster studies at the household level 
have found similar positive relationships (Showalter 1993). 
The coefficients on organizational obstacle (p<0.1) and 
organizational obstacle squared (p<0.05) show that there is a positive 
significant association between mitigation and preparedness and 
organizational obstacle until organizational obstacle peaks at 1.56, and then 
the association becomes negative.1 The perception of respondents is that 
increases in the level of organizational obstacle lead to increases in the 
number of mitigation and preparedness activities adopted until 
organizational obstacle peaks at 1.56 where further increases in 
organizational obstacle lead to decreases in the number of mitigation and 
preparedness activities engaged in over the past year.  
The result also indicates that mitigation and preparedness activities 
are negatively associated with single-location organizations. This significant 
result (p<0.01) is in line with that of previous research (Quarantelli et al. 
1979; Drabek 1991; 1994a; 1994b; 1995).  
Furthermore, number of employees is a significant predictor of 
mitigation and preparedness (p<0.01). The larger the organization, the more 
likely it is to have engaged in mitigation and preparedness activities in the 
past year. This finding is in accordance with that of previous studies 
(Quarantelli et al. 1979; Drabek 1991; 1994a; 1994b). One reason for the 
positive relationship between organizational size and mitigation and 
preparedness is that larger organizations have the necessary resources, such 
as staff and time, to adopt mitigation and preparedness measures (Dahlhamer 
and D’Souza 1997).  
Finally, all the control variables have significant associations with 
mitigation and preparedness. This association is positive for organizations in 
the educational and health sectors and negative for organizations in the 
wholesale/retail trade sector. Dahlhamer and D’Souza (1997) also found a 
negative but insignificant relationship between organizations in the 
                                                 
 
 
1 Mitigation and preparedness = 1.03 meanobstacle – (0.33) meanobstacle2 
Δ mitigation and preparedness/Δ meanobstacle = 1.03 – 2(0.33) meanobstacle 
Δ mitigation and preparedness/Δ meanobstacle = 1.03 – 0.66 meanobstacle 
1.03 – 0.66 Meanobstacle = 0 
Meanobstacle = 1.03/0.66 = 1.56 
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wholesale/retail sector and disaster preparedness. In sum, the signs from the 
bivariate analysis are similar to those of the multivariate analysis.  
The marginal effects are the same as the Tobit coefficients. The 
independent variable with the biggest marginal effect is single-location 
organization. Holding all other variables at their means, single-location 
organization decreases expected mitigation and preparedness by about 2.71 
units.  Conversely, a unit increase in number of employees leads to a 0.84 
unit increase in expected mitigation and preparedness holding other 
variables at their means.  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The main goal of this study is to answer the question “what are the 
determinants of mitigation and preparedness at the organizational level?” 
The multivariate Tobit analysis result reveals that there is a significant 
positive relationship between mitigation and preparedness and 
organizational size. In other words, the smaller the organization, the fewer 
the number of mitigation and preparedness activities that will be adopted. 
This finding is in accordance with that of previous research (e.g., Quarantelli 
et al. 1979; Drabek 1994a; 1994b; 1995; Dahlhamer and D’Souza 1997). 
Some disaster studies have explained the positive association between 
mitigation and preparedness and organizational size in terms of 
unavailability of resources. In other words, smaller organizations do not 
have the resources to invest in mitigation and preparedness. This resource 
argument is common in the disaster literature (Mileti et al. 1993; Dahlhamer 
and D’Souza 1997).  
This study also finds that concern over disaster impact is a 
significant positive determinant of mitigation and preparedness among 
Memphis/Shelby County organizations. In addition, the ownership pattern of 
organizations is a significant determinant of mitigation and preparedness in 
organizations. Single-location organizations are less likely to engage in 
mitigation and preparedness when compared to organizations with multiple 
locations. This result is in line with that of previous research (e.g., 
Quarantelli et al. 1979; Drabek 1991; 1994a; 1994b; 1995). One reason why 
multiple-location organizations are more likely to engage in mitigation and 
preparedness is because the corporate headquarters of these organizations 
mandate their local chapters to engage in risk reduction (Dahlhamer and 
D’Souza 1997).  
This study finds a significant positive relationship between 
mitigation and preparedness and organizations in the educational and health 
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sectors. One interpretation of this result is that educational and health sector 
organizations are more likely to engage in mitigation and preparedness 
activities because they are highly regulated by the local, state, and federal 
governments. This is not uncommon since they deal with vulnerable 
populations like children, the old, and the sick. Conversely, there is a 
significant negative relationship between mitigation and preparedness and 
organizations in the wholesale/retail sector. One explanation is that 
organizations in the wholesale/retail sector do not usually deal with 
vulnerable populations. This may be why they are less likely than 
organizations in other sectors to mitigate and prepare for disasters. 
Dahlhamer and D’Souza (1997) also found an insignificant negative 
relationship between preparedness and organizations in the wholesale/retail 
sector. In addition, the coefficients on organizational obstacle and 
organizational obstacle squared show that there is a positive association 
between mitigation and preparedness and organizational obstacle until 
organizational obstacle peaks and then the association becomes negative.  
 
Policy Implications 
 
Organizations concerned over the impact of disasters seem to be more likely 
than those that are not to mitigate and prepare for disasters. This result has 
an implication for policymaking by suggesting that governments may be 
able to design and implement computer programs capable of estimating 
different types of disaster losses. This result may have implications for 
organizations that have invested in such computer programs. FEMA and The 
Mid-America Earthquake Center, for example, have invested heavily in 
HAZUS and MAEviz, respectively (FEMA 2008; Mid-America Earthquake 
Center 2006).   The rationale behind developing these programs is that they 
can help to visualize disaster impacts and motivate organizations and people 
to act. The result of this study supports this rationale. However, this study 
cannot say whether such programs are effective in actually motivating 
organizations to adopt mitigation and preparedness activities because this 
depends, among other factors, on the design and implementation of the 
program. If local, state, and federal agencies can design and implement such 
programs properly, they may be able to motivate organizations to mitigate 
and prepare for disasters.  
The significant positive relationship between organizational size and 
mitigation and preparedness suggests that governments at all levels should 
regard small businesses as a special group that may need specific incentives 
like tax breaks and subsidies to make them adopt more mitigation and 
preparedness measures.  
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Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
This study has some limitations. First, this study may suffer from omitted 
variable bias because of the omission of some independent variables relevant 
to mitigation and preparedness—past disaster experience, age of the 
organization, and whether an organization leases or owns its business 
property (Dahlhamer and D’Souza 1997; Mileti 1999). In addition, this study 
did not explore community, political culture, and social variables as possible 
determinants of mitigation and preparedness. Second, recoded values are not 
the actual values of the missing data. Third, adding mitigation and 
preparedness activities together implies that each activity is equally 
weighted. This may not be a reasonable assumption as explained earlier. 
These limitations engender words of caution in generalizing the results of 
this study.   
This study suggests several next steps in understanding the 
determinants of mitigation and preparedness in organizations.  First, further 
research is needed that can incorporate the independent variables that this 
study did not explore to understand fully the relevant determinants of 
mitigation and preparedness in organizations.  Second, researchers may 
explore community, political culture, and social variables as possible 
determinants of mitigation and preparedness. Third, it might interest some 
researchers to investigate the relative costs and benefits of each of the 
mitigation and preparedness activities.  Fourth, future research endeavors 
might want to examine whether the determinants of mitigation are different 
than those of preparedness at the organizational level. 
Appendix 
  
Results of the Additional Analyses 
This study carries out two additional analyses. First, this study drops all the 
cases with missing values and runs a Tobit analysis using the same 
independent and dependent variables. The results show that four independent 
variables (concern over disaster impacts, organizational obstacle, 
organizational obstacle squared, and organizations in the health sector) that 
were initially significant (n=215) became insignificant. In addition, two 
independent variables (organizational obstacle and organizational obstacle 
squared) reversed their signs.  
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 Second, this study examines each of the mitigation and preparedness 
activities individually with the same independent variables as in the Tobit 
analysis. The aim is to gain a deeper understanding of the relationships 
between each of the mitigation and preparedness activities and each of the 
independent variables. The number of employees and single-location 
organization is significant. In fact, number of employees is significant and 
positive in all the 10 activities. Single-location organization is significant in 
all but one activity and has a negative sign in all the activities. 
Organizational obstacle, organizational obstacle squared, and concern over 
disaster impact are insignificant in all but one activity each. In sum, the 
results from the two additional analyses differ from that of the current 
analysis.  
 
Result of the Sample Representative Test  
 
The result of the difference of means tests reveals that there is no statistical 
difference between the population mean and the sample mean. The 
implication is that the organizational survey sample is representative of the 
population based on the number of employees alone. However, this study 
cannot say anything about the representativeness of the organizational 
survey sample based on unobservable characteristics like the mitigation and 
preparedness activities adopted.  
 
Results of the Specification Tests: Nonlinearity and Omitted Variable 
 
This study performs a RESET Test on the data with the aim of investigating 
whether the relationship between the dependent variable and any of the 
independent variables is nonlinear. This study created a squared term for 
each of the independent variables and then tested if these squared terms 
belong to the model or not (Stata dropped all dummy variables because of 
perfect collinearity). The null hypothesis is that none of the squared terms of 
all the independent variables belongs in the model. The result of the F-test 
revealed that organizational obstacle squared belongs in the model. 
This study also performs a LINK test on the mitigation and 
preparedness model to ascertain if Tobit is the appropriate function to use 
and if the model has omitted important determinant(s). If the model is 
specified properly, there should not be any additional determinant(s) that 
would be significant in the model except by chance. What the LINK test 
does is to rebuild the model using the linear predicted values (_hat) and the 
linear predicted value squared (_hatsq). The result of the LINK test indicates 
that the linear predicted value is a statistically significant predictor and the 
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linear predicted value squared is not a statistically significant predictor. 
Since the linear predicted value squared is not significant, the LINK test is 
not significant. Although the result indicates that my model uses the 
appropriate function and there are no omitted variables, still there may be 
problems with the model that the LINK test failed to detect.  
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